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PREFACE
The chapters in this book all derive from a two-day symposium – Tax
Simplification: An African Perspective – held in Sandton, Johannesburg,
South Africa on 9-11 October 2018. The symposium was convened by tax
academics from the University of Pretoria, the University of South Africa
(UNISA), the University of Johannesburg and the University of New
South Wales (UNSW Sydney), together with tax colleagues from the
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA), which was
also the principal funding body for the symposium. Roughly 50 national
and international participants, drawn from academia and all aspects of the
tax profession, attended the symposium, which involved presentation and
discussion of 16 papers together with more extensive panel discussion
sessions. The papers were subsequently revised by their presenters, re-
submitted as possible chapters for this book and subjected to a rigorous
double-blind peer review process involving a panel of distinguished
national and international referees, resulting in the 12 chapters in the book.
The purpose of the symposium was to consider all aspects of tax
simplification – and its antonym, tax complexity – in an African (and
primarily South African) context. Four key themes were explored in the
papers: key principles, concepts, expectations and elements of simplicity
and simplification in the tax context; the consequences of tax complexity;
a comparative analysis of African and other country experiences with tax
simplification; and an analysis of what might be done to address tax system
complexity. Those themes are now also reflected in the chapters in this
book.  
The symposium would not have happened without the support of a
number of persons and institutions. Particular thanks are due to colleagues
(administrative and academic) in the African Tax Institute and in the
Department of Taxation at the University of Pretoria; to academic
colleagues from UNISA, the University of Johannesburg and UNSW
Sydney; to PWC South Africa for their sponsorship of the symposium
dinner; and to the many speakers and other participants who contributed
so vibrantly to the debate and discussions at the symposium. Above all,
thanks are due to Pieter Faber and his colleagues at SAICA who made the
event possible with financial, logistical, administrative and intellectual
support.
I would also like to acknowledge all those who have made this book
possible: the chapter authors who have so diligently revised their chapters
in the light of participant discussion at the symposium and subsequently
the comments received from the referees and others; those referees for their
painstaking and insightful reviews of the potential chapters of the book; my
co-editors, Professors Lilla Stack and Riël Franzsen, for their tireless
editorial and reviewing work; Lizette Hermann and her team at Pretoria
University Law Press (PULP) for making the publishing process so
straightforward and (relatively) painless; and above all Dr Peter Mellor
from Monash University who spent countless hours as publication editor
and ‘scrutineer extraordinary’, pulling all the chapters into shape and
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ensuring they are fully compliant with the PULP style guide, and also
imposing consistency, coherence and grammatical sense where (often)
required. Needless to say, any faults that remain in the book do not lie with
him.
The need has become pressing to simplify all aspects of taxation and this
imperative is recognised by taxation authorities throughout the Western
world. This book makes a unique contribution by opening the discussion
and debate on various aspects of tax simplification.
Chris Evans
UNSW Sydney and University of Pretoria
November 2019
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FOREWORD
Tax Simplification in the United Kingdom: Some Personal Reflections
John Whiting*
Some personal reflections on tax simplification in the United Kingdom (UK),
based primarily on the author’s six and a half years as the first Tax Director of
the UK’s Office of Tax Simplification. 
This foreword will draw on my time and experiences with the Office of
Tax Simplification (OTS). It will not be a discussion of what the OTS has
or has not done; instead this will be a discussion of some of the lessons I
and potentially the OTS more widely learned from efforts to simplify the
UK’s tax system – lessons that caused the OTS to adapt its way of working;
lessons as to what could or could not be done; lessons perhaps for HM
Treasury, Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) and indeed
government as a whole on why this is worth pursuing.1 
My background is as a long-time tax practitioner, with 25 years as a
partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers. During that time, I was always
involved in the Chartered Institute of Taxation (CIOT) and was fortunate
enough to be its President in 2001. One of my themes for my Presidency
was the need to simplify the tax system and it is an issue that I have always
championed. The Coalition government formed in 2010 had tax
simplification as a point within its coalition agreement and I had a call
from the newly-appointed Minister2 to say – in effect – that I had been
‘droning on’ about tax simplification for ages, so why did I not do
something about it? He and the then Chancellor of the Exchequer3 asked
me to set up a new body – the Office of Tax Simplification. 
I hope I will be able to set the scene for the chapters that follow in this
volume by trying to answer questions that may spring to anyone’s mind
when thinking about tax simplification:
• Why simplify? 
• How (not) to do it?
• What are we tackling?
• Who best to do it?
• When to do it?
1 This foreword has been developed from the Keynote speech given by the author on
10 October 2018 at the Tax Simplification: An African Perspective conference,
Johannesburg.
1 I accept that some may see a degree of contradiction in taking lessons in simplification
from a country that starts its tax year on 6 April … and yes, the OTS has
recommended that that be changed, so far without success. 
2 David Gauke MP, then Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury, now the Rt Hon David
Gauke MP, until July 2019 Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor. 
3 Rt Hon George Osborne MP.
*
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• What are the barriers to simplification?
• Is it worth it?
The Office of Tax Simplification: an outline
The OTS was set up in effect informally, not on a statutory basis. It was a
grounded in the coalition agreement between the Conservative and Liberal
Democrat parties. It was to be independent but sponsored by HM Treasury
and indeed housed in the Treasury building.4 If that sounds a little non-
independent, there was definite Ministerial support and access to the
Minister. But from the outset it was clear that the OTS had to demonstrate
its independence. 
Unsurprisingly the OTS was a small operation, with under six full-
time equivalent staff. I was initially one day per week (but it was a long
day …). Importantly, from the outset it was to have a mix of civil servants
and practitioners and that proved a vital decision.
What was the OTS to do? Essentially, study areas of the tax system
and report, each project taking up to one year. The areas had to be agreed
in advance with Ministers which, in reality, also meant that HM Treasury
and HMRC were happy with the projects as they would be advising
Ministers.5 It was expected that the OTS would come up with a range of
recommendations, both short and long term, but avoid policy issues and
formulate the recommendations on a revenue-neutral basis.
Why simplify?
Simplification is not a new issue, as King Edward VI commented in 1550: 
I wish that the superfluous and tedious statutes were brought into one sum
together, and made more plain and short.6
Edward died young … hopefully not as a result of his championing of
simplification. 
Another, slightly later, impetus to simplify comes from Adam Smith
(emphasis added):
4 HM Treasury is housed in one section of the building known as ‘GOGGS’ – built as
‘Government Offices Great George Street’ in Westminster, London, close to the
Houses of Parliament. HMRC occupies much of the rest of the building. So, the OTS’s
location in the building facilitated working with HM Treasury and HMRC and was
undoubtedly practical – the OTS was never going to be large enough to warrant its
own premises. 
5 Examples of OTS projects include tax reliefs; small business; share schemes;
pensioners; and penalties. All reports can be found on the OTS website: https://
www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-tax-simplification.
6 As quoted in, for example, Report by the Committee appointed by the Lord President
of the Council (Rt Hon Sir (later Lord) David Renton, chair) (Renton Committee) The
preparation of legislation Cmnd 6033 (London, May 1975) para 2.8.
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Little else is required to carry a State to the highest degree of opulence from
the lowest degree of barbarism but peace, easy taxes and a tolerable
administration of justice.7
But why should we try to simplify the tax system? That may seem a non-
question: to most people it will be an obvious aim. But it is worth setting
out some reasons to help guide how the job is tackled. I would suggest key
reasons are aiming to ensure that:
• The system is easier to deal with and so allow all parties to meet
obligations;
• The system is easier to understand (not quite the same thing as the first
point);
• Less time and effort is wasted doing so;
• Fewer errors are made. 
These are of course for all involved – taxpayers, agents and HMRC.
Including the tax authority is important: simplification has to work for
them. With the pressures HMRC is under there is an obvious attraction in
a simpler-to-run system. 
I would add that a simpler system:
• Increases confidence among taxpayers (that they will be compliant);
• Increases trust in the system (understanding increases trust).
These have a corollary: the more complex a system gets, the more time that
is wasted, more errors made, and less trust people have in the system. It is
worth debating whether the average taxpayer really has confidence that
they are paying the right amount of tax. 
There is clear resonance here with Adam Smith’s four key principles
of (to summarise): Certainty/Convenience/Efficiency/Equity.8 He did
not actually say ‘simple’, but I think it is implicit in his principles. 
All these reasons helped a Tax Commission set up by the Conservative
party (then in opposition) in 2008 to conclude that ‘something has to be
done’ – and that something was an OTS.9 A key issue was growing
concern about the administrative burdens tax put on businesses, especially
small businesses. The report also drew attention to the UK having the
longest tax code in the world10 – that remains a potent image, but length
7 Lecture in 1755, quoted in Dugald Stewart, Account of the life and writings of Adam Smith
LLD (1794), Section IV, 25.
8 Adam Smith An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (1776), Book V,
Ch II, Pt II, 825, paras 3-5.
9 UK Government Making taxes simpler: The final report of a Working Party chaired by Lord
Howe of Aberavon (July 2008) (Howe report), available at: https://conservative
home.blogs.com/torydiary/files/making_taxes_simpler.pdf.
10 ‘UK has longest tax code in the world’ – release by LexisNexis, reported by Jonathan
Russell, ‘UK has longest tax code handbook in the world’ Daily Telegraph (6 September
2009), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/61469
11/UK-has-longest-tax-code-handbook-in-the-world.html (accessed 16 April 2019). 
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of legislation is only one of the factors around complexity, not the be all
and end all of it.11
It is worth saying at this point that Lord Geoffrey Howe, who chaired
the Commission, coined what is perhaps the best description of the tax
simplification job – ‘it’s like painting Brighton pier ... whilst someone else
is extending the pier to France’.
A simple approach
It would of course be very easy to simplify the tax system if one had
complete carte blanche. Scrap income tax … or simply leave tax bills to the
discretion of the tax authority. These do address those simplification
drivers set out above. However, they have some obvious drawbacks and
are potentially well away from Adam Smith’s principles. In short,
simplification still has to be fair and workable. 
What are we tackling: what is complexity?
It is therefore necessary to dig deeper and define better what we are
tackling. Instead of just looking at simplification, we need to look at
complexity – what is that? Yes, it is the opposite of simplicity, but defining
it will help the approach to be taken in simplifying. 
It is apposite to draw on the OTS’s complexity index at this point. The
index is something the OTS developed to help compare areas of the tax
code and so guide its work to areas that offered the best ‘payback’. The
index was developed over a period and went through some iterations,
arriving at ten factors: 
1. Number of exemptions plus the number of reliefs. 
2. The number of Finance Acts with changes (since 2000). 
3. The Gunning-fog readability index. 
4. Number of pages of legislation. 
5. Complexity of HMRC guidance. 
6. Complexity of information requirement to make a return. 
7. Number of taxpayers affected. 
8. Aggregated compliance burden for a taxpayer and HMRC. 
9. Average ability of taxpayers. 
10. Revenue at risk due to error, failure to take reasonable care and avoidance. 
There are reasons why the OTS settled on these (and not other factors), not
least to get a balanced picture. The main point is that the index tries to
11 Indeed, there is an argument that a longer tax code could be simpler – if the length
means that the provisions are spelt out more carefully and clearly.
  Tax Simplification in the United Kingdom    xi
 
assess complexity in terms of its impact – so where would the OTS get
most ‘bangs for its simplifying buck’.12 
But if those were ten factors, the OTS also wanted to try to assess the
greatest causes of complexity. In one of the OTS’s early projects, talking to
businesses produced a resounding vote for the main cause being change.13
In other words, the more the tax system changes, the more complex it gets.
Why? Well, people just lose track of things; they do not have time to
assimilate the rules. Over the years I tested this on many audiences and
always found it readily endorsed as a key factor. 
But two other things came through over the years as also very
significant causes of complexity. First, fairness: that may seem odd – surely
making the system fairer will make it easier to deal with? Well, yes, it can
do if it means, for example, leaving the low-paid out of the income tax
system. But trying to introduce ‘tweaks’ to make a tax fairer can add
complexity: exemptions and reliefs need to be carefully defined to make
sure they are targeted – and that will add complexity.
A second, and less obvious, factor is choice. This can often follow from
attempts to make the system fairer. Taxpayers are given the ability to elect
for something – a relief, exemption or alternative treatment. Politicians
like choice – it often seems like empowerment. The problem is that the
taxpayer must be informed to make a choice. Without the necessary
knowledge the relief or whatever will not be taken up.14
I have regularly argued that it is simpler if the taxpayer is told what to
do or what is best. The OTS regularly recommended a ‘default basis’ – that
a particular treatment should apply, subject to the taxpayer opting away
from it if they concluded a different (potentially more involved) route
would be beneficial.15 
So, one principle that needs to be borne in mind by anyone trying to
develop a simpler system is, I would argue: ‘choice brings complexity’. 
12 The full index and methodology can be found at Office of Tax Simplification
‘Complexity index’ (June 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/of
fice-of-tax-simplification-complexity-index. 
13 See Office of Tax Simplification ‘Small business tax review’ (28 February 2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/small-business-tax-review. 
14 The taxpayer with an agent will of course find that the well-qualified agent will ensure
that all appropriate claims, reliefs and exemptions are taken but it is clear from
comments from HMRC that areas where taxpayers do not claim reliefs, often through
ignorance, prove fertile ground for so-called ‘high volume repayment agents’ – see, for
example, HMRC, Compliance manual (last updated 4 September 2018), https://
www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/compliance-handbook/ch820000.
15 Examples would be recommendations for flat rate expenses: Office of Tax
Simplification ‘Review of employee benefits and expenses: Second report’ (29 January
2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-employee-benefits-
and-expenses-second-report, and the cash basis for the smallest businesses: Office of
Tax Simplification ‘Small business tax review’ (28 February 2012), https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/small-business-tax-review.
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How to do simplification: first principles
How, then, to progress matters? The obvious route is what might be termed
technical simplification: changing – or deleting – rules. I think the Howe
report vision was for the OTS to concentrate on technical simplification:
simpler rules, fewer pages of legislation.
But there is a second approach: administrative simplification. By this I
mean making the system easier to deal with, through better forms and
procedures, and generally streamlined systems. 
It is always interesting to ask an audience which they see as more
important. The usual view, with which I concur, is that both are important
and need to be taken forward – but administrative simplification is perhaps
more important. It is possible to make a complex system easy to deal with
if the interface is easy – so good administration can mask complexity, at
least to some extent.16 More subtly, the tax authority can normally effect
administrative simplification without having to wait for legislative change. 
Another important principle has to be that simplification must work
for all parties – taxpayers, agents and HMRC. It would be possible to
simplify something from an HMRC viewpoint, but the result would be
more complexity for taxpayers (or vice versa). That would not really be
simplification. Simplifying something for one party would be valid if there
is no additional burden on others, but it will be much more powerful if it
helps all. 
I was often asked what I saw as the goal of the OTS – how would the
OTS know if it had really succeeded? My best suggestion: taxpayers should
understand what is required and how to comply. Maybe that should be the
aim of the tax system generally? It may be worth noting that the tax system
does not have an aim/objective – wouldn’t it be helpful if it did have some
principles that would guide its development?17 
Working methods to achieve simplification
So far, I have tried to set out what is to be tackled: what might be termed
the strategic approach. Moving to the tactical – how should the work of
simplification be carried out? These are core principles that were
confirmed or developed through a mix of design and experience as
described in each case: 
• Use the right people: the mix of staff, public and private, really helped the
work identify with all sides and was crucial. The OTS built trust because it
could speak all languages! It would not have worked to have just private
sector people – there would not be an entrée to HMRC/HM Treasury in
16 Anyone who doubts this is invited to consider their mobile phone … Does the user
actually understand how it works inside the casing? But despite this can they use it?
17 Scotland follows the Adam Smith principles in developing their tax system – see
Revenue Scotland ‘Scottish approach to tax’, https://www.revenue.scot/about-us/
scottish-approach-tax. Yes, I know they are only small but if they can do it.
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the same way; and solely public sector staff would not get businesses/
agents to open up and engage fully. The OTS used people who knew what
they were talking about, for example partnerships experts to lead the
partnerships project. But people must want to work for the OTS –
thankfully they do, as OTS does not pay much!18
• Wide evidence gathering: this was making a virtue out of necessity in many
ways. The OTS did not have enough people to do all the work and so had
to get out and about and gather ideas, evidence and input generally. From
the start, the OTS was keen to show it was not a think tank but a group of
practical people. It became a point of principle to get around a genuinely
representative sample of businesses (certainly not just agents) and areas of
the country. The OTS talked to the ‘usual suspects’ – the main professional
and trade bodies – but also made very sure to talk to a lot of unusual ones
as well. 
• Practical, evidence based: the OTS wanted to develop recommendations that
were going to work in practice and rest on evidence that they will indeed
do so. Input was accepted from anyone and everyone – my boast was that
nobody could say ‘the OTS wouldn’t talk to me’. Indeed, some people who
did say that were bemused to find themselves contacted, invited to host a
meeting or even invited onto a consultative committee.
• Work for all: this needs reiterating. It is not necessarily that all will benefit
from everything that is recommended but there is a need to have thought
of all. It will be difficult to bring in something that will help one area but
damage others, unless there are balancing changes. Importantly, things
should work for HMRC as well as taxpayers. Ideally changes would not
just affect one business sector though I do not see that as a definitive rule.
• Costings: there two aspects – first, any recommendation must be ‘worth it’ –
so needs to be worth effecting, given that change is the greatest cause of
complexity. Secondly and perhaps more obviously are the revenue
implications. Here, an early lesson was that trying to get a revenue neutral
package was too restricting. Instead we had to have regard to revenue
implications, on all sides. Not full, precise costings – that would be
premature – but enough to show that the ideas made sense. 
Improving the OTS 
Any new organisation will make mistakes or find it can improve and the
OTS is no exception. These are some of the lessons learned, often
stemming from that overriding need to build practical ideas that will work: 
• The whole basis of the OTS was important and a major change was to get
the Office put on a formal, statutory basis. That was not easy but was key
to stressing its independence and obtaining a greater element of authority
for the work. 
• The statutory basis also gave the OTS power to choose its own projects – it
was not restricted to things agreed in advance with Ministers. That is not a
power to use unthinkingly: trying to do something that HMRC, HM
18 When it was set up, there was a belief from government that the private sector would
readily second people into it at no cost. The OTS was fortunate in gaining secondees
from a number of firms but predictably they were only ever a proportion of the staff
required and the OTS quickly learned that it had to recruit – and pay – its own staff.
Most were recruited for particular projects, almost all on a part-time basis. 
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Treasury and Ministers had no interest in would probably not get far when
it came to implementation. But it allows some more ‘think pieces’. 
• Note also that the OTS now has to produce an Annual Report, allowing
some reflection on what it has done and how its ideas have been
progressed.
• Short- and long-term ideas: the OTS always tried to do both; some ‘quick
wins’ that would deliver value quickly (and so show progress, not least to
our stakeholders and contributors), but also some structural ideas that
could deliver bigger wins. Just doing one or the other would not work. 
• Put forward answers where appropriate: if there is a definite way forward,
make clear recommendations. But if something requires more exploration,
say so, ideally with the direction further work and potential reform should
take.
• Policy changes: to start with, the OTS was told it could not ‘do policy’. But
that is an impractical restriction. Simplification needs to be able to
challenge and potentially change the significant parts of the system, not
just accept things as they are and do minor tweaks to procedures. Clearly
policy decisions are for Ministers, but to make progress there must be a
challenge to how it all works.
• Expose the issues: this is a development and something that has increased
in importance. In many ways it is how to achieve big change: accept that
there is a preliminary stage of exposing the issues and promoting debate.
Subtly, it has been realised that it can be very useful if the OTS looks at
something that is controversial and floats some ideas. That avoids it
appearing as if the government is committed to changing the rules or
changing them in a particular direction.19 
Who does the simplification work?
This may seem a non-question: surely the answer is going to be the OTS or
an equivalent organisation? That is indeed my view – but the OTS is the
focal point, not the only point. There are some further important principles
here that emerged:
• An OTS cannot change the law, or practice: certainly, in the UK, changing
the tax system must be a parliamentary matter. It is not something that is
going to be devolved to an independent group. 
• For all the work an OTS does, it cannot do everything or bottom out all the
nuances. It needs to do enough to show that the proposed change is
sensible and workable, but government will inevitably want to test any
significant change further to ensure that all views have been considered.20 
19 A recent example: the UK has a very high registration threshold for VAT – over GBP
85,000 before a business has to come into the VAT net. The OTS looked at it, showed
how it distorts business and affects competition, and thus showed why a different level
might be sensible. That has prompted a good deal of constructive debate and the
registration threshold has in the meantime been frozen. See Office of Tax
Simplification ‘OTS report on routes to simplification for VAT is published’
(7 November 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ots-report-on-
routes-to-simplification-for-vat-is-published. 
20 A corollary is that it would wrong for the OTS to try and bottom out comprehensively
most potential changes, simply because it would be a waste of effort if Ministers decide
not to pursue the matter. The trick is to make a persuasive case for change and its
direction.
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• One regular issue is the cost/revenue question: how much was a change
going to cost? The OTS did not have the economic capability to develop
fully detailed costings so this was always an area for indicative work with
details to follow once the direction of reform was agreed.
Points such as these mean all the following parties need to be involved in
simplification work:
• HMRC – the tax authority must support and be involved: they know most
about how things operate and often why things are as they are. 
• HM Treasury – the Treasury guard policy and are the main advisers to
Ministers. So, they can effectively block something by advising against it if
not properly involved.
• Taxpayers, agents and business/trade bodies – if the evidence gathering
has been done properly, they should see that the proposals are sensible and
will be supportive. But it is inevitable that not everything that each such
stakeholder group wants can be recommended. There can be reasons why
not to – or simply that there must be a balance. The key is to make sure it is
clear that views have all been considered and explanations given for why a
particular route has or has not been chosen.
• Politicians – yes, they need to be involved! After all, the Minister will have
to take the changes through Parliament. For my time at the OTS there was
very good engagement and support from our sponsoring Minister. But I
had envisaged that the Treasury Committee, a group of Members of
Parliament who scrutinise the Treasury and HMRC on behalf of
Parliament, would take an active interest in our work. Ideally, they would
have a look at our reports and say (in effect) ‘These look good ideas – why
aren’t you Minister/HMRC taking them forward?’ but we did not get
that.21 
It does not mean that everyone has to agree with everything: the OTS has
to be ready to put forward proposals that it believes the case has been made
for, even if some of the above will disagree or oppose.
When to simplify: stock and flow
The OTS was set up to look at the ‘stock’, i.e., what is on the statute book.
That immediately raised issues about whether the OTS would
consequently just be ‘fiddling around’ with a few bits and pieces whilst a
great flood of new things was coming – the flow.22 
There were regular calls for the OTS to look at the UK’s annual
Finance Bill and report on its simplification attributes. Although this
seems a desirable idea, it is impractical, not least because of timing, and the
resources needed. And would the OTS really be allowed to block it? 
A better way forward on the flow – new measures – is input to their
development and so influence over what is coming. Simplification needs
to be built into policy development. HMRC and HM Treasury will say that
21 The only time the OTS was on their agenda was to confirm the Tax Director and the
Chair appointments.
22 Another analogy for the OTS was that it was pushing water uphill against a waterfall!
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it is already but, in my view, not consistently. I have argued that it needs
to be evidenced – that simplification needs to be on the ‘TIIN’ (the Tax
Information and Impact Note) that is supposed to accompany all new
measures. There is a risk that that becomes a ‘tick box’ exercise, but it
would at least evidence that simplification has been considered.
Early involvement is facilitated by the power that the second,
statutory, incarnation of the OTS has to look at what it wants to, within its
simplification objective. Thus, the OTS can contribute to consultations.
The OTS is also more regularly involved in developing policy where it
relates to its recommendations – something that should be axiomatic to
ensure its recommendations are fully understood and appreciated.
Avoiding complexity 
There were inevitable calls for the OTS to opine on how to avoid
complexity. This resulted in a paper,23 codifying some of what had been
learned into four key principles:
1. Ensure the proposed tax measure meets the policy aims. 
2. Focus the measure carefully. 
3. Design the measure to meet the aim. 
4. Maintain the measure properly. 
This probably does not sound like rocket science or a revolutionary set of
findings but it is powerful if followed, especially the last point. That is
something regularly encountered – out of date legislation, limits or
thresholds getting in the way of transactions or imposing burdens not
intended when the measure was developed. Some might reflect that the
whole system of corporation tax as widely practised in many countries is a
classic example!
Barriers to simplification
Hopefully most of the readership of this volume will be convinced of the
need for, and value of, simplification. But some things will get in the way:
• Exchequer cost – if a simplification measure is really going to cost a lot of
money, it is probably a non-starter. More subtly, if there are winners and
losers within an overall minimal cost, then losers may have to be
compensated … which means there is a cost after all.
• Risk – in the early days some in HMRC were concerned that simplification
would just create loopholes … that simplification would mean more
avoidance. The solution was to show with recommendations that such
23 Office of Tax Simplification ‘OTS complexity project’ (February 2017), available at:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/603478/Principles_of_avoiding_complexity_updated_Feb17.pdf. 
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risks had been considered and point a way to how to manage any
exposure.24 
• Getting the change through – there can be a lot of opposition to what
seems like a sensible proposal! This can range from simple inertia (why
change… ‘it’s been OK for X years’) through to vested interests: abolishing
a relief as it is not working properly and is too complex, intending that
money is spent elsewhere, will inevitably be opposed by those who do
manage to claim it.25 
• Political – how will the change play politically? There is a subtlety that it is
best, if possible, to make it easy for Ministers to say ‘yes’. So, at times do
not be too binary: show how benefits will accrue from more work in a
certain direction to allow momentum for change to develop.
Simplification in action: some examples
Small business cash basis
In theory all businesses have to prepare full accruals-based accounts. In
practice, most small unincorporated businesses do not; they just account
on a cash basis and this has largely been condoned. But the rule was there,
until the OTS challenged it with a proposal to allow the cash basis. This
garnered a lot of support in removing burdens, though some opposition
from accountants who argued that cash accounting removes crucial
information from business owners. The counter to that was that the OTS
proposal was not compulsory – it would be by choice but, as a result of the
principle of choice causing complexity, the OTS also argued that the cash
basis would be the default basis, and if businesses wanted to elect away
from that – probably because they were growing – that would be fine. 
Cash accounting was duly enacted and is now in use by millions of the
smallest businesses.26 
24 An example would be the proposal for an exemption for trivial benefits given by
employers to staff: see Office of Tax Simplification Review of employee benefits and
25 expenses: Second report (January 2014) ch 5, available at: https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/review-of-employee-benefits-and-expenses-second-report. 
25 The allowance for ‘late night taxis’ is a classic example: 90% or more of the relief goes
to ‘City’ finance sector people rather than, as is popularly supposed, to the nurse who
has worked a late shift, but many argued that abolition would penalise too many
ordinary employees. Wrong, but the argument prevented reform. Originally proposed
in the Tax Reliefs review: Office of Tax Simplification ‘Tax reliefs review’ (3 March
2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tax-reliefs-review; see also
Office of Tax Simplification Review of employee benefits and expenses: Interim report
(August 2013) ch 8, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
review-of-employee-benefits-and-expenses-interim-report. 
26 Office of Tax Simplification ‘Small business tax review’ (28 February 2012), https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/small-business-tax-review. Note that this was
not for companies – though the OTS did propose that later.
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Share schemes 
This is an example of a complex, technical area the OTS tackled.27 There
were a range of tax-advantaged share plans available, but with differing
bases and rules. The OTS proposed various harmonising steps in the rules
and ways of streamlining processes, most of which went through. 
The OTS also looked at the rules around ‘unapproved’ share plans,
though with less progress, probably due to avoidance worries.
Blind person’s allowance 
The UK has an extra tax allowance for the blind – which the OTS
recommended abolishing.28 This was not because the OTS were a tough
and unfeeling lot, but the point was that the allowance was only claimed
by about one-third of those eligible. The reasons were a combination of:
not having enough taxable income; difficulties with the administration; or
simply lack of awareness. 
Instead, the OTS recommended replacing the allowance with a direct
grant at the equivalent value. The blind charities were all in favour, but it
did not happen. Leaving aside the extra cost to HM Treasury, there was
great concern about the change being misunderstood and portrayed as a
tax grab from the blind, even though no one would lose and overall they
were getting more money.
Land and buildings transaction tax
The land and buildings transaction tax (LBTT) is the Scottish replacement
for the UK’s stamp duty land tax (a property transfer tax).29 As Scotland
could start with a clean sheet in terms of procedures, simplification
principles could be incorporated into the design to ensure the system that
was implemented worked for taxpayers and their agents as well as for the
tax authority. That has resulted in 99% of tax returns being submitted
electronically using a system that is easy to use and fits with how users
operate. 
Income tax and National Insurance Contributions
Probably the most popular simplification move in the eyes of many people
and businesses would be to merge income tax and National Insurance
27 Office of Tax Simplification ‘Share schemes simplification recommendations put
forward’ (6 March 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/share-schemes-
simplification-recommendations-put-forward; and Office of Tax Simplification
‘Employee share schemes review’ (16 January 2013), https://www.gov.uk/govern
ment/publications/employee-share-schemes-review.
28 Office of Tax Simplification ‘Tax reliefs review’ (3 March 2011), https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/tax-reliefs-review.
29 Revenue Scotland ‘Land and buildings transaction tax’, https://www.revenue.scot/
land-buildings-transaction-tax.
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Contributions (NICs, the UK’s social security system).30 To those outside
the system, this is obvious and would save a lot of effort for HMRC,
employers and indeed individuals (who in turn would understand things
much better). 
The OTS did a major project and showed the benefits that would
accrue from bringing the two taxes closer together – harmonising them –
and also that a full merger of the two taxes was impractical.31 But little has
been done – partly because there would be significant numbers of winners
and losers in the simplification process. With little chance of money being
available to compensate losers, that meant great political difficulty in
taking measures through, particularly when attention is inevitably focused
on the larger issue of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union
through the Brexit process. 
Benefits-in-kind: P11D forms
The P11D is the HMRC form that has to be submitted by an employer
when an employee is given a benefit-in-kind – broadly something other
than pay. Until recently, some 4.4 million forms were completed each
year, imposing significant administrative burdens on HMRC and
employers, and confusing many employees. The OTS developed
proposals, starting with payrolling of benefits, which would hugely reduce
the numbers of P11Ds required.32 Reforms in this direction have started
and are already having an impact. 
Conclusion – evaluating simplification: is it worth it?
Is simplification worth doing? I think it is. I do not believe we can ever
have a simple tax system – but that should not stop us striving for a simpler
system.
Measuring the OTS’s success (or otherwise) is difficult. In the early
years the OTS monitored how many recommendations were taken
forward and could show a reasonable ‘hit rate’.33 But that is crude and,
especially when the OTS is developing longer term, structural reforms,
success in relation to those broader reforms is less easy to measure. In
many ways the key success is that simplification is on the agenda. 
The OTS can be shown to be value for money. Its annual budget
initially was less than GBP 500,000; it is now more than GBP 750,000 but
that remains very good value – not least because of the way the OTS got so
30 In the polling of businesses on their perception of the main causes of complexity (see
text at n 13 above), income tax/NICs was the second biggest cause of complexity.
31 Office of Tax Simplification ‘Closer alignment of income tax and national insurance
contributions’ (7 March 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/closer-
alignment-of-income-tax-and-national-insurance-contributions.
32 Office of Tax Simplification ‘Review of employee benefits and expenses: Second
report’ (29 January 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-
employee-benefits-and-expenses-second-report.
33 See, eg, Office of Tax Simplification ‘OTS list of recommendations’ (27 March 2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ots-list-of-recommendations.
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much free or cheap input to its work from stakeholders. Two measures
alone (cash accounting and the programme to eliminate millions of the
P11D forms referred to in the previous section above) will save far more in
administration costs than the OTS has cost and would not have happened
without the OTS.
A final thought: there is always a lot of emphasis on the need for the
tax system to be fair. But I would argue that a system that is too complex
for most people to navigate cannot be fair. Simplicity and fairness in many
ways pull against each other – but actually simplification should be seen as
part of the effort to make a fairer system.
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Abstract
While simplicity is a desirable feature of a good tax system, simplification is
more a slogan than a part of an actual policy agenda in many countries.
Striking out on a different path, the United Kingdom (UK) has adopted an
innovative approach to tax simplification with its creation of an independent
advisory body, the Office of Tax Simplification (OTS), in 2010. This chapter
reviews the UK experience with the OTS and considers whether there is a
place for an organisation equivalent to the OTS in other countries. Following
a discussion of the independent status and the advisory role of the Office, the
chapter concludes that the OTS has shown its value in achieving
simplification of the administrative and compliance aspects of the tax system
but it has had a limited role in bringing about more fundamental changes.
The OTS experience provides important lessons for other countries as to
what might be achieved with an independent institution undertaking
simplification responsibilities. 
1 Introduction 
Tax simplification has been the mantra of tax reformers for decades, but
attention has sharpened in recent times with the realisation that
simplification holds the key to reducing the government’s tax
administration costs and taxpayers’ compliance burden. Although
governments talk about it and ‘simplification’ is cited as a rationale for
every type of tax change, few have gone so far as to embrace the goal as a
statutory objective. In this respect, the United Kingdom (UK) leads the
world with the creation of the Office of Tax Simplification (OTS), an
independent office of HM Treasury, in 2010 and its elevation to a statutory
body in 2016. The OTS was established to provide independent advice on
simplification of the tax system to the government of the day. 
4CHAPTE
R THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF
TAX SIMPLIFICATION IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
LESSONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES
* The authors would like to thank John Whiting, the first Tax Director of the OTS, and
Paul Morton, the second Tax Director of the OTS, for comments on earlier drafts of
this chapter. All views in the chapter are those of the authors only. 
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Over its short history, the OTS has surveyed some of the thorniest
areas of the UK tax system, including tax reliefs, small business taxation
and employee benefits and expenses. Many consider its work to have been
a significant success, but there are critics who question the value of OTS
recommendations. This alternative view sees the creation of OTS as a
reactive move by the government made without careful planning, in
response to the increasing complexity in the UK tax system.1
The unique nature of the OTS has attracted international attention and
prompted questions as to whether any aspects of the initiative may have
application elsewhere. Clearly the actual work program of the OTS cannot
be directly transferred to another jurisdiction. However, the possible role
of a statutory body providing independent advice on simplification to the
government of the day may be an option that countries seeking solutions
to complex tax laws should consider. The review of the work and impact
of the OTS set out in this chapter may be a helpful catalyst for devising
simplification programs in other jurisdictions. The chapter starts with a
brief history of the OTS, followed by an introduction to the challenge of
simplification, an issue fundamental to the understanding and evaluation
of the role of the OTS. The chapter then assesses the independent status of
the OTS and its advisory role in terms of achieving substantive
simplification of the law and simplification of administrative processes.
Finally, it concludes with lessons for other countries. 
2 A brief history of the Office of Tax Simplification 
The idea of the OTS was mooted in a 2008 report2 from a Conservative
Party Working Party led by Lord Howe, established by the then Shadow
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne MP. The OTS was
subsequently set up by the coalition government in 2010 as a response to
the complexity of the UK tax system. One important implication of being
an independent office of HM Treasury is that the OTS was initially
established on a temporary basis, having the same lifetime as the then
Parliament. 
The tasks of the OTS are to identify and advise the government on the
areas of complexity in the UK tax system that have the potential to be
simplified and to conduct inquiries into complex areas of the tax system,
collect evidence and advise the government on options for reform.3 The
initial and interim framework documents, which are non-statutory, clearly
set out the remit of the OTS, including reviewing the existing tax law, the
1 J Freedman ‘Creating new UK institutions for tax governance and policy making:
Progress or confusion?’ [2013] 4 British Tax Review 373.
2 Working Party chaired by Lord Howe of Aberavon Making taxes simpler: The final report
of a Working Party chaired by Lord Howe of Aberavon (July 2008). 
3 HM Treasury, HM Revenue & Customs and Office of Tax Simplification ‘Office of
Tax Simplification Framework Document’ [2010] (Framework Document).
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underlying policy and administrative aspects of the tax system.4 At the
time of establishment, the OTS could only carry out simplification reviews
of matters agreed with the Chancellor. As an advisory body, the OTS can
only make recommendations. Whether or not the recommendations are
taken forward and the policy decisions are made remains a matter for
Ministers. 
Initially the OTS was established as an experiment with a small size
and budget. It was understaffed for the work it was assigned. The Office
has a board that is comprised of a Chair and a Tax Director, as well as one
senior official from each of HM Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs
(HMRC). The initial Chair was the Rt Hon Michael Jack, a former MP
and Treasury Minister, and the initial Tax Director was John Whiting, a
former PricewaterhouseCoopers partner and past president of the
Chartered Institute of Taxation. The board was supported by a mix of full-
time secondees from HM Treasury and HMRC in addition to individuals
from the private sector working two to three days per week. In the first five
years, the OTS had an equivalent of four to six full-time staff. 
The OTS is funded jointly by HM Treasury and HMRC. It had a small
operating annual budget of GBP 500,000 in its first five years. Both the
Chair and Tax Director were initially unpaid. The government expected
much of the OTS work to be done with free secondments from the tax
profession.5 It was estimated that the OTS enjoyed free private sector
support worth GBP 500,000 over the course of its first five years.6 
The role of the OTS was viewed positively by politicians and many
commentators, in particular in light of the limited resources available to
the body. During the first five years the OTS completed ten major projects,
published 32 reports and papers and made 401 formal recommendations.7
Its work covered a wide variety of topics and degrees of specificity, some
very narrowly targeted (for example, share schemes, and employee
benefits and expenses) and some broader (for example, small business
taxation and HMRC guidance). Some were short term (for example,
thresholds) and some long term (for example, a complexity index). A
frequently cited measurement of the impact of the OTS is the volume of its
recommendations that have been taken forward by the government, which
scores over 50%. 
4 Framework Document (n 3 above), and Office of Tax Simplification, ‘Office of Tax
Simplification Interim Framework Document’ [2015]. 
5 J Sherwood et al ‘The Office of Tax Simplification: The way forward?’ [2017] 2 British
Tax Review 249.
6 Sherwood et al (n 5 above). 
7 The OTS recommendations in the first five years were summarised in Office of Tax
Simplification ‘OTS simplification recommendations: summary at March 2015’,
26 March 2015. 
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Its performance in the first five years had convinced many that it
should be granted a more sustainable status to allow it to play a greater role
in simplifying the UK tax system8 and in 2015, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer announced that the Office would be made a statutory body
with the shift effected in the Finance Act 2016. Since then the OTS has a
larger size and budget and a wider remit. Its budget for the financial year
April 2017 to March 2018 was GBP 870,000. It now has an equivalent of
eight to ten full time staff. Importantly, under its statutory power, the OTS
can now look into areas of complexity on its own initiative. 
3 The challenge of tax simplification 
Tax complexity is recognised as a feature common to many modern tax
systems around the globe.9 Simplification of the law or administration to
address this complexity must be based on a clear understanding of what
causes tax systems to be complex and how the simplification objective
weighs up against the primary objectives of a good tax system. Three
factors might give rise to tax complexity – the language of the law itself is
difficult to understand and hence apply, the administrative procedures that
must be followed to comply with the law are complicated and, most
significantly, the policy of the law creates complex distinctions between
commercially similar transactions or establishes borderlines difficult to
apply in practice. 
One reason policy matters lead to complexity is the increasing use of
the tax system by policy-makers to achieve social and political goals.10 A
commonly cited example is the use of tax relief for redistributive purposes
that not only creates boundary problems but also often requires further
anti-avoidance rules to prevent abuse of concessions.11 At the same time,
any proposal to simplify the law or administrative policy must be balanced
against other objectives, for example, efficiency and equity, in a good tax
system. As Freedman noted, ‘simplification cannot be the only, or even the
main, driver of tax reform’.12 
The volume of legislation provides an arguably less reliable measure of
complexity, with many arguing that a clearer drafting technique that uses
plain English may increase the length of legislation but make the
legislation more easily readable by lay persons who did not receive legal or
8 T Bowler ‘The Office of Tax Simplification: Looking back and looking forward’
Institute for Fiscal Studies Tax Law Review Committee Discussion Paper No 11,
December 2014.
9 Sherwood et al (n 5 above) 262; J Freedman ‘Managing tax complexity: The
institutional framework for tax policy-making and oversight’ in C Evans et al (eds) Tax
simplification (2015) 253. 
10 A Broke ‘Simplification of tax or I wouldn’t start from here’ [2000] 1 British Tax Review
18. 
11 Broke (n 10 above) 22. 
12 Freedman ‘Managing tax complexity’ (n 9 above) 255. 
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tax education.13 Simplification of legislation may benefit taxpayers in a
less direct manner than it was thought, however. Legislation is most often
used by experts and advisers, rather than individual end users. The volume
of rulings and litigation is clear evidence that the law as it stands is not
clear. Simplification that removes uncertainty and ambiguity will
ultimately benefit the end user who would no longer have to pay for advice
at each step currently needed to clarify the meaning. The final products of
the Tax Law Rewrite Project (TLRP) in the UK that was set up in 1996
with an aim of making the UK’s direct tax legislation clearer and easier to
use were considered ‘an improvement on the previous chaos’,14 although
the length of legislation was significantly increased as a result of rewriting.
Simplification of the language of tax law and operational aspects of the
tax system will not address underlying policy complexity. It is nevertheless
accepted that complexity in terms of policy is inevitable because the world
in which the tax system operates is complex and there are political and
other objectives that prevail over the simplification objective.15 This is,
however, not to say that simplification should not be pursued. Rather,
where changes of underlying policy cannot be made, the tax law and
administrative and compliance procedures should be simplified as much as
possible to reduce the burden for tax authority and taxpayers.16
4 The independent status 
If complexity is a problem that calls for simplification, who should be
assigned primary responsibility for a simplification agenda? The growing
complexity of tax law led to the view that there would be value in bringing
input from an independent body into the tax law reform process. The
alternative would have been to require the Treasury and HMRC to
evaluate simplification options for all proposed legislation in light of the
higher-level policy drivers that led to the foreshadowed changes to the law
in the first place. 
The independence of an advisory body has two limbs. First, the Office
should be independent from the government so that the proposals and
recommendations are not formed under political pressure and do not
reflect the political interest of the government of the day. Second, the
Office should be sufficiently independent from the business community to
avoid becoming a lobby group by another name. An independent office
clearly has a potential advantage in achieving the simplification objective
in a more transparent and unbiased manner. The extent to which it
13 See for example, C Turnbull-Hall & R Thomas ‘Length of tax legislation as a measure
of complexity’ Office of Tax Simplification research paper, April 2012. 
14 Lord Howe of Aberavon ‘Simplicity and stability: The politics of tax policy’ [2001] 2
British Tax Review 113 114. 
15 Freedman ‘Managing tax complexity’ (n 9 above) 254; Bowler (n 8 above). 
16 Freedman ‘Managing tax complexity’ (n 9 above) 254. 
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accomplishes these lofty goals may, however, depend on whether its
structure impinges on its genuine independence. 
Although the OTS was established as a discrete entity within the
Treasury as a result of the agreement establishing a coalition government,
its ‘independence’ was questioned particularly in, but not limited to, its
first five years of existence, prior to its eventual shift to become a statutory
body.17 It was (and remains) physically located in the Treasury building,
was reliant on funding from the Treasury budget, and had a life no longer
than the lifetime of the then government. The OTS has at all times worked
closely with HMRC and HM Treasury while remaining independent from
both organisations. The input from HMRC and HM Treasury is especially
useful in testing ideas and developing practical and feasible
recommendations. Until it acquired greater independence as a statutory
body, the OTS was subject to the normal Treasury chain of command and,
as noted, could only take on projects for study that were agreed with the
Chancellor. It is accountable to the Chancellor and is bound by the
Finance Bill and Budget processes.18 The OTS’ limited tenure initially
prompted it to seek ‘quick wins’ that could yield immediate simplification
benefits and in the process build the case for its continuation.19
Evaluations of the success of the OTS in its first five years were made
in the context of the limited resources available to it, especially its small
size and operating budget.20 The consensus was that the OTS had
achieved more than what was expected given its lack of resources, with
success attributed by some to the Office’s personnel, its highly respected
and experienced chair and tax director, and most notably their success in
attracting free support from the private sector by way of secondment.21
Private sector secondees can bring much-needed tax expertise and
practical experience to the Office. 
At the same time, however, the policy assumes seconded employees in
pursuit of the goals of their temporary employer will offer advice that
might be against the interests of their past and, following secondment,
restored clients or contrary to their future professional interests. Separately
from the OTS experience, evidence considered by the Committee of Public
Accounts suggested that there had been some incidence of secondees to the
Treasury and HMRC deliberately failing to alert the departments of
17 See, for example, Letter of 29 June 2015 from Andrew Tyrie MP to George Osborne
MP, http://downloads2.dodsmonitoring.com/downloads/misc_files/TyrieLetter29
06.pdf (accessed 30 September 2018).
18 Bowler (n 8 above) 22. 
19 Sherwood et al (n 5 above) 255. 
20 See A Sawyer ‘Moving on from the tax legislation rewrite projects: A comparison of
the New Zealand tax working group/generic tax policy process and the United
Kingdom Office of Tax Simplification’ [2013] 3 British Tax Review 321; J Whiting et al
‘The Office of Tax Simplification and its complexity index’ in C Evans et al (eds) Tax
simplification (2015) 238. 
21 Sherwood et al (n 5 above) 262. 
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loopholes in the legislation that they could exploit upon a return to private
practice.22 If true, the same might be assumed of secondees to the OTS.
This is, at best, a difficult proposition to test and, at worst, a grave risk.23
Another factor that was said to have contributed to the success of the
OTS is its consultative approach.24 Recognising that wider support holds
the key to the successful implementation of changes, the OTS consults
with stakeholders, in particular potential losers from the changes, across
the nation to understand their concerns. However, while the engagement
from the business community is no doubt of great value in policy-making,
there appears to be insufficient effort to collect the views of other interested
parties, including the academic community. The latter, in particular, may
be in a position to enhance the quality of OTS work by complementing
practicability with theoretically sound options. 
In general the OTS is viewed as having less independence and
authority in the policy-making process than some advisory non-
departmental public bodies, such as the Office for Budget Responsibility
and the Law Commission.25 Critics of the independent status of the OTS
see the design features that reduce its independence as design flaws and call
for greater resources and an expanded size and role for the OTS.26 These
recommendations appear to presume that simplification is an end in itself.
The design features that constrain the independence of the OTS may,
however, simply reflect the government’s perception that simplification is
a means to an end of an efficient and fair tax system that imposes the least
administrative and compliance costs possible, not an ultimate objective in
its own right. 
5 The advisory role 
5.1 The focus on administration and compliance
The OTS is strictly an advisory body with no remit to carry out substantive
changes such as the tax law rewrite projects that have been conducted in a
number of jurisdictions, including the UK, Australia and New Zealand.
The constraints imposed on the Office raise an important policy question:
22 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts ‘Tax avoidance: the role of large
accountancy firms’, April 2013; J Rutter et al Better budgets: Making tax policy better
(Institute for Government, January 2017).
23 J Whiting & M Gammie ‘Tax policy making in the United Kingdom’ (2013) 61(4)
Canadian Tax Journal 1057. 
24 Sherwood et al (n 5 above) 
25 Bowler (n 8 above) 22-23. 
26 Letter of 29 June 2015 from Andrew Tyrie MP to George Osborne MP (n 17 above);
J Rutter ‘Making tax policy better: The case for strengthening the Office of Tax
Simplification’ (1 September 2015), https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/
blog/making-tax-policy-better-case-strengthening-office-tax-simplification (accessed
14 December 2018).
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what features discussed in section 3 above that give rise to complexity can
be successfully addressed in a simplification program? 
Simplification of the language of the law, as exemplified by the TLRP
in the UK, has often been criticised on the basis that a redraft of the law
without changes to the underlying policy will fail to address the prime
causes of complexity in the tax system. The limitations of the TLRP
prompted the establishment of the OTS, promoted as ‘a key element in any
attempt to start a process of simplification and legislative reduction’.27 The
OTS, as it was envisaged initially, was thus expected to achieve more
fundamental simplification. As noted, it was permitted to investigate and
advise on both substantive and administrative aspects of the tax system. 
After a few years of operation, however, the OTS now places its focus
on simplification of administration and compliance, in particular
simplification of user experience by the use of technology.28 The shift of
focus towards administrative issues may be driven primarily by the desire
of the OTS to achieve ‘quick wins’, a result of design constraints discussed
in section 4 above. OTS reports today often contain distinct short-term,
medium-term and long-term recommendations. Proposals for short-term
and medium-term changes primarily deal with administrative issues. The
longer-term proposals address key policy issues with the aim of stimulating
debate and encouraging thinking about new challenges to the tax system
in the context of simplification. 
Substantive tax policy questions are inherent in some ‘administrative’
issues and it was inevitable that the OTS would at different times review
substantive aspects of complexity while focusing on various administrative
and compliance matters. Many of the substantive changes proposed by the
OTS have not been implemented, however. It has been suggested that the
government has often failed to provide an explanation of why it did not
follow OTS recommendations when it chose not to do so.29 
One reason that the government of the day may not implement
recommendations of the OTS is a conclusion that they may entail too great
a political risk, even where the OTS has considered broader political or
socio-political aspects of a proposal. An example is the recurring
recommendation in the OTS reports that National Insurance
Contributions (NICs) should be aligned with the income tax to achieve
simplification benefits for employers and the self-employed.30 The
simplest option, clearly, would be folding the NICs into the corporate and
individual income taxes but the simplification benefits would be
27 Working Party chaired by Lord Howe of Aberavon Making taxes simpler (n 2 above) 5. 
28 Office of Tax Simplification Annual report 2017-18: Simplifying the tax system to make it
easier for the taxpayer to use (July 2018). 
29 Bowler (n 8 above) 2. 
30 Office of Tax Simplification Small business tax review: Interim report (March 2011);
Office of Tax Simplification Employment status report (March 2015). 
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accompanied by the elimination of the country’s most significant
hypothecated tax. While critics of hypothecated taxes argue that every
government should have full discretion to spend revenue as it sees fit as per
the mandate it received from the electorate, there is a widespread
consensus in the UK that responsible governance entails respect for
decisions of previous governments to quarantine some revenues through a
hypothecated tax for pensions. The logic of this position is that these social
welfare obligations transcend day-to-day political considerations and
should be insulated from the whims of governments or voters, given the
legitimate expectation of current and future pensioners that the pension
system will continue.  
Initially, the OTS made the radical recommendation of integrating the
income tax and NICs, which was immediately rejected by the government.
Alerted to the high level socio-political constraints, the OTS bypassed
what would have been the first best option if simplification was the only
consideration and moved to options that retained separate income tax and
NICs.31 The final proposal was for ‘alignment’ or ‘operational integration’
of the two regimes, a system that would retain the separation of the two
taxes but use a common tax base and collection system. To date, these
proposals have attracted limited support in Whitehall, no doubt because of
direct political implications, and following a call for evidence in 2011, the
only main achievement has been the shift of Class 2 NIC collections to a
self-assessment regime.32 As the OTS notes, the changes could be designed
to be revenue neutral, but there would be both losers and winners from the
changes, with the total tax burden rising for some and declining for
others. The government’s reluctance to embrace the proposal is
presumably related to political sensitivities over the former group.
The OTS’s remit was backward-looking in the first five years when it
was only allowed to study the stock of current tax law and explicitly
prevented from playing a role in the development of new tax measures.
The examination of current law was not without merit. It filled a gap in the
UK policy-making process which lacked an effective system for the review
of tax law after implementation.33 For example, concessions remained on
the statute book without scrutiny long after they ceased to serve a useful
purpose or achieve the policy aim originally intended. 
However, the limitations that restricted the OTS from examining
legislative proposals both before their release in the budget and after the
budget night before enactment into law considerably undermined its
ability to review substantive policy issues and effectively excluded it from
the core policy-making process. With the establishment of a separate tax
simplification office patching the cracks and filling the holes after the fact,
31 Office of Tax Simplification Small business tax review: Interim report (n 30 above). 
32 Bowler (n 8 above) 16. 
33 Whiting & Gammie (n 23 above) 1063. 
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the government in effect conceded that the law was not designed properly
in the first place. The extent to which effective simplification can be
achieved is therefore questionable, if the OTS is clearing up some
complexities while the government is creating more at the same time.34
For example, despite the abolition of 47 reliefs following the first report of
the OTS, the total number of reliefs soon increased to a level exceeding that
in effect at the time of the report.35
The restriction that prevented the OTS from reviewing new laws,
found in its original 2010 framework and the 2015 interim framework, was
not included in the Finance Act measures that established the OTS as a
statutory body36 and, accordingly, did not appear in its revised 2016
framework document37 prepared by the OTS in anticipation of its new
status. Since that time the government has shown a real interest in OTS
involvement in ongoing policy development, a shift that recognises the
benefits of accessing the Office’s greater experience and access to
resources. 
The move that was viewed by many as positive raises the question of
how the OTS should interact with HM Treasury and HMRC in tax policy
development. In general, the Treasury is concerned with high-level
structural aspects, whereas HMRC is concerned with administrative and
operational aspects of the tax system.38 With the OTS working
independently on simplification, there is a risk of duplication of work
between the body and the two government departments, in particular
when the OTS tries to align its work with those of the Treasury and HMRC
to increase the chance of making changes. The OTS could itself be a source
of complexity in the case of overlapping responsibilities.39 
A more worrisome possibility is that the increasing involvement of the
OTS in the policy making process may lead to a retreat by the Treasury and
HMRC to a single lens focus, with the Treasury focusing on the impact of
tax policy on economic growth, HMRC focusing on administration and
revenue raising and the OTS focusing on simplification. None of these
functions can operate in its own silo as each draws on aspects of the others.
34 Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales ‘Budget 8 July 2015 –
ICAEW Suggestions’, 2015, https://www.icaew.com/~/media/corporate/files/tech
nical/tax/tax%20faculty/taxreps/2015/taxrep%2031-15%20icaew%20comments%20
in%20advance%20of%208%20july%20budget.ashx (accessed 30 September 2018). 
35 J Whiting ‘Tax simplification: what has the OTS ever done for us?’ (2015) 1263 Tax
Journal (21 May). 
36 Finance Act 2016 ss 184-189. 
37 Office of Tax Simplification ‘Office of Tax Simplification Framework Document’,
May 2016 (Revised Framework Document), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/522874/
20160512_ots_draft_revised_framework_document.pdf (accessed 29 September 2018). 
38 Whiting and Gammie (n 23 above) 1060. 
39 The point was made in a broader context in M D’Ascenzo ‘Pathways for tax policy
and administration: Institutions and simplicity – an Australian perspective’ in C Evans
et al (eds) Tax simplification (2015) 293. 
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The challenge is to balance the risk of duplication with the necessary
integration of simplification and other policy objectives. Each of the
parties needs room to specialise in one aspect while engaging with the
others and incorporating into its own work the perspectives of concern to
the other parties. How this is to be achieved in practice is a question yet to
be resolved. 
5.2 Balancing simplification and tax objectives
A model tax collects revenue in an efficient and equitable manner while
imposing the lowest possible compliance and administrative costs. An
opportunity for simplification that does not undermine the economic
neutrality and equity of a tax should, of course, be pursued. Simplification
that yields a loss of neutrality or equity may be acceptable if the savings to
taxpayers and tax administration greatly outweigh a marginal decrease in
efficiency or equity. An issue to be resolved in the context of a body such
as the OTS is whether the organisation is equipped to balance these
considerations if simplification cannot be achieved with no cost to tax
objectives. 
The terms of reference for the OTS anticipated this broader
perspective, with its initial framework document noting that although the
primary focus of the Office would be on simplifying the tax system, it
would be expected to consider the potential impact of options it puts
forward on the government’s objectives of the tax system. In practice,
however, it is less clear how well the OTS recognises the efficiency and
equity implications while focusing on simplification benefits. Its recent
work on the consequences of the UK’s high VAT registration threshold
illustrates the inherent contradictions faced by those seeking to simplify the
tax law.40 An initial simplification measure may lead to unintended
behavioural responses, prompting proposals for ameliorating measures
that might in turn offer opportunities for avoidance and trigger new anti-
avoidance rules. The end result may be that one type of complexity is
substituted for another. 
The use of a registration threshold is a feature of the VAT law intended
to reduce administrative and compliance costs by excluding small
businesses from the VAT system. Adoption of a threshold to protect small
businesses from disproportionately high compliance costs comes at a cost,
namely the phenomenon of business ‘bunching’ just below the registration
threshold. Small businesses have two incentives to remain below the
registration threshold – they avoid the compliance costs associated with
being in the VAT system and, if they sell to final consumers who do not
require tax invoices, they enjoy a price advantage over registered
competitors. While the price of their goods and services includes a
40 Office of Tax Simplification Value added tax: Routes to simplification (November 2017). 
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component for unrecovered input tax on their acquisitions, there is no tax
imposed on the mark-up of unregistered businesses. 
The OTS identified three types of business behaviour that explain the
bunching phenomenon. First, small businesses may deliberately hold back
expansion to remain unregistered. Secondly, businesses with true
turnovers above the threshold may fraudulently under-report sales. Third,
businesses may split the enterprise along operational lines with each part
remaining a separate person below the threshold. Appropriate risk analysis
and audit processes by HMRC can address the second problem and an
existing anti-avoidance rule41 that combines the turnovers of associated
enterprises for threshold measurement purposes addresses avoidance
based on the third technique. The primary concern of the OTS is the first
type of behaviour, however. The concern is the deliberate restraint by small
businesses that results in reduced productivity across the economy. 
The OTS explored two options for smoothing the financial and
compliance impacts of crossing the threshold. The first was further
increased use of the Flat Rate Scheme (FRS) now available to small
businesses just above the threshold as an alternative to costly tracking of
input tax credits and the second, and more radical option, was adoption of
a new ‘financial smoothing mechanism’ that would provide newly
registered small businesses that have just crossed the registration threshold
with a disappearing credit which would phase out completely at an upper
threshold. 
The OTS report noted the view of small businesses that they value the
FRS as a simplification measure. The FRS system works by substituting a
presumptive input tax credit entitlement for measurement of actual input
tax costs. As the FRS system is voluntary, it is likely to be used
predominately by businesses that benefit financially from the presumptive
input credits – that is, enterprises that can claim more credits under the
FRS than their actual input tax. In an effort to more accurately align the
presumed entitlement under the FRS with actual inputs, the formula
applies 45 different rates for different industries. The complex
classification regime leads to increased compliance and administration
costs and reduced economic efficiency and revenue as businesses calculate
tax both using and not using the scheme to decide whether it is financially
beneficial. At the same time, borderline enterprises or those with mixed
outputs falling into more than one camp take steps to shoehorn themselves
into the more generous classification. 
Apparent abuse uncovered by HMRC has led to the recent adoption of
‘limited cost trader tests’ to restrict access to unreasonably generous
presumptive entitlements. The anti-abuse measures built into the FRS
41 Value Added Tax Act 1994 sch 1 para 1A (amended by Finance Act 1997 c 16 sec
31(1)). 
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regime provide an example of concessions that require anti-avoidance
rules to safeguard the regime, an outcome that further complicates the tax
system. The case for the FRS as a simplification measure that reduces
compliance costs, too, is yet to be made convincingly, however. An
argument that it helps to reduce bunching, the primary aim of the
simplification proposals, may be even more difficult to sustain. 
The ‘financial smoothing mechanism’, the second OTS proposal to
reduce bunching, offers tapering credits for businesses that cross the
registration threshold. The credits would allow traders to retain some of
the VAT collected from customers as compensation for both the higher
fiscal costs and the higher compliance costs they face as registered taxable
persons. The tapering feature gradually reduces credits as a business grows
until they are withdrawn entirely at some point.
A tapering credit system along the lines of that explored by the OTS
poses a number of challenges for policy-makers. The tapering system needs
to be sufficiently generous to encourage transition to the normal VAT
system but avoid excessively high windfall gains to successful growing
businesses that would make no effort to remain deliberately below the
registration threshold in the absence of a subsidy. The regime needs to be
designed in a manner that does not give rise to new bunching problems as
enterprises resist further growth that would result in a loss of credits or
engage in splitting schemes to remain entitled to a credit. One solution to
this problem might be adoption of a time limit for credits provided to
businesses eligible for the transitioning concession so there are no
incentives for businesses capable of further expansion to cap outputs below
the point at which concessions are withdrawn. 
The idea of a smoothing system based on tapering retention of VAT by
traders has been tried in a few countries, including Japan, Finland and the
Netherlands. Their experience is far from encouraging, however.42 If a low
upper threshold is adopted, as is the case in Finland, the regime does not
provide enough incentive for small businesses to join the VAT. If the
threshold is high, as is the case in Japan, the regime would deliver windfall
benefits to businesses that were within the VAT or would join the VAT
even without subsidies. Significant revenue losses attributable to windfall
benefits led Japan to abolish its smoothing regime eight years after
implementation. 
Upon receipt of the OTS report, the government opened the proposals
to public consultation.43 It soon recognised, however, that smoothing
42 See further Y Zu ‘VAT/GST thresholds and small businesses: Where to draw the line?’
(2018) 66(2) Canadian Tax Journal 309.
43 HM Treasury ‘VAT registration threshold: Call for evidence’ March 2018, https://
www.gov.uk/government/consultations/vat-registration-threshold-call-for-evidence
(accessed 30 September 2018). 
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mechanisms in their simple form would reduce efficiency gains and lead to
a revenue loss for the Treasury.44 Its response to the conundrum has been
to shelve the OTS proposals for possible revisiting after the Brexit chaos
subsides.
It is not clear how rigorously the OTS considered potential limitations
or efficiency and revenue costs of its proposed changes. The
recommendations nevertheless have value as they alert the government to
the problems and provide it with the information that is helpful for making
the correct policy decision in the long run. Too much information,
however, is not necessarily an advantage as HMRC and HM Treasury
have limited resources and are already burdened with other priorities.45
The OTS recommendations would be of greater value if the Office could
clearly identify compromises with other objectives for achieving simplicity
with any particular change it proposes to provide sufficient information for
the government to make the ultimate decision. This, however, would lead
to a larger question of whether more balanced advice on policy changes
could be made with an independent ‘tax simplification’ or ‘tax policy’
office as was envisaged by Freedman.46 
6 Conclusion 
The UK experience with the OTS reveals a dilemma faced by policy-
makers on the path towards tax simplification. The establishment of the
OTS showed the government’s commitment to a simpler tax system. At
the same time, many design features of the OTS appear to compromise its
ability to tackle fundamental complexity. These features reflect a paradox
of tax policy: while simplification of the tax system is desirable, it cannot
be pursued at the cost of retreating from intended underlying tax policy
objectives. 
Although the creation of the OTS has often been criticised for not
being based on careful planning, the value of the Office has been clearly
shown, in particular in respect of administrative simplification. Substantial
policy changes are difficult to achieve, with or without an independent tax
simplification office. The accomplishments of the OTS to date probably
reveal its limitations, and the body should not be expected to address more
fundamental problems. It nevertheless illustrates the potential of an office
of this sort to influence policy development and increase the chance of
building simplification into new rules. At the end of the day, political and
other considerations may explain why the government might not adopt
measures recommended to simplify the tax system. The importance of
44 HM Treasury ‘VAT registration threshold: Summary of responses’ October 2018. 
45 Sherwood et al (n 5 above) 260. 
46 Freedman suggested that an ‘Office of Tax Policy’ would be a much better institution.
See Freedman ‘Creating new UK institutions’ (n 1 above). 
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generating discussion and exposing options for simplification cannot be
understated, however. 
The OTS experience provides important lessons as to what might and
might not work for simplifying the tax system. Countries that seek to
replicate the OTS should have a well thought through view about what
such an office is expected to achieve before its adoption. The ultimate
design of a tax simplification body, which will to a large extent determine
its effectiveness, will reflect a government’s perception on how
simplification is weighed against political and tax objectives. If
simplification is pursued as one of the core policy objectives, it is most
sensible to look beyond after-the-fact simplification to make it part of the
policy-making process. Importantly, the role of the body and how it is
expected to interact with the Treasury and the revenue authority to
develop a coherent policy need to be clearly defined from the start. There
is no panacea for complexity in the tax system. The OTS model may be a
useful starting point for jurisdictions seeking mechanisms for simplifying
their complicated tax systems. 
